CPJ Safety Advisory: Journalist targets of Pegasus spyware

Updated September 29, 2022

Pegasus is a spyware created for mobile devices which transforms a cellphone into a mobile surveillance station. Researchers have documented it being used to spy on journalists around the world. This raises significant implications for journalists’ own security and that of their sources.

Pegasus can be inserted onto a phone in a number of ways detailed below. Once on the device, the spyware gives the attacker the ability to monitor, record, and collect existing and future data from the phone. This includes calls and information from messaging applications and real-time location data. The spyware is able to remotely activate the camera and microphone to surveil the target and their surroundings.

The Israel-based NSO Group, which produces Pegasus, markets tools for investigating crime and terrorism to government agencies. (NSO Group has repeatedly told CPJ that it will not comment on individual cases, but investigates reports that its products were misused in breach of contract.)

Guidance for journalists and newsrooms

Pegasus is designed to be installed on phones running Android, and iOS without alerting the target to its presence. Journalists will likely only know if their phone has been infected if the device is inspected by a trusted tech expert. Journalists who are concerned may wish to share this guide with them.

If you have reason to believe you have been targeted and have spyware on your device:

• Stop using the device immediately.
• Store the phone where the microphone and camera will pick up the least amount of your personal activity, away from work and other places where you spend a lot of time, such as your bedroom.
• Log out of all accounts and unlink them from the device.
• From a different device, change all your account passwords.
• Seek expert digital security advice. If you are a freelance journalist or do not have access to tech support, contact the Access Now Helpline.
• If it is essential to use the device before you can replace it, carry out a factory reset and ensure that your operating system, apps, and browsers are updated to the latest version. This does not guarantee that the spyware will be removed from the device. However, Amnesty International noted in July 2021 that Pegasus appears to be removed when devices are rebooted. If you are using an iPhone iOS 16, enable lockdown mode.
• The Amnesty International report also said 700 domain names had been used by Pegasus to infect devices and recommended that media outlets check their network telemetry and DNS logs for these sites as an indication that they may have been targeted by the spyware.
• Amnesty’s Mobile Verification toolkit for tech experts can help confirm whether a device has been infected by Pegasus.

Advice for different types of attack

Pegasus can be installed in a number of ways. Journalists should keep up to date on these methods and take appropriate steps to protect themselves and their sources.

Zero-day attacks

Zero-day attacks, also known as zero-click attacks, exploit vulnerable software, not people. They require no interaction from the user.

Protecting yourself against a zero-day attack is difficult. Journalists who may be targeted by a sophisticated adversary such as a government should:

• Use an iPhone iOS 16 and turn on lockdown mode.

For journalists using other phones and operating systems:

• Back up your content regularly and carry out a factory reset of the phone.
• Consider using cheap Android phones and changing them frequently as a precaution – every few months, weeks, or even days, depending on your level of risk. Ensure all phones have been factory reset before using them.
• Update your phone’s operating system regularly, as well as apps and browsers.
• If possible, contact a digital security expert for one-to-one support.

Network injection attacks

A network injection attack does not require any interaction with the user; instead, it involves the automatic redirecting of browsers or apps to sites controlled by attackers. This is also known as a Man in the Middle Attack (MITM). Once connected to the malicious site, attackers infect the device through vulnerabilities in the software.

A journalist is highly unlikely to know whether they have been the target of this type of network injection attack and protecting against it can be difficult.

To minimize risk:

• Use a virtual private network (VPN) on both cell phones and computers.
• Check the law with regards to the use of a VPN in the country you live in or are traveling to.
• Research the VPN company to ensure that it does not store data on users, including browser history and log in details, as this could be accessed by governments.
• Check whether the VPN provider has close links to government bodies or is owned by governments.
• Choose a service that is located outside the country you live in and that has a good track record of privacy.

Spear-phishing attacks

Attackers create tailor-made messages that are sent to a specific journalist. These messages convey a sense of urgency and contain a link or a document which the journalist is encouraged to click on. The messages come in a variety of forms, including SMS, email, through messaging apps such as WhatsApp, or via messages on social media platforms. Once the journalist has clicked on the link, then the spyware is installed on their phone.

Research by Citizen Lab and Amnesty International found that messages tend to take the following forms:

• Messages purporting to be from a known organization such as an embassy or a local news organization.
• Messages that warn the target may be facing an immediate security threat.
• Messages that raise any work-related issue, such as covering an event that the target usually reports on.
• Messages that make appeals on personal matters, such as those relating to compromising photos of partners.
• Financial messages that reference purchases, credit cards, or banking details.

The suspect messages may also arrive from unknown numbers.

Attackers can target personal and work phones. To better protect themselves and their sources, journalists should:

• Verify the link with the sender through a different channel of communication. This should preferably be through video or voice.
• If the sender is not previously known to you, secondary channels may not provide successful verification of the links, as such channels may be set up by the adversary as part of an elaborate cover identity.
• If the link utilizes a URL shortener service like TinyURL or Bitly, input the link into a URL expander service such as Link Expander or URLEX. If the expanded link looks suspicious, for instance mimicking a local news website but not being quite the same, do not click on the link.
• If you feel you need to open the link, do not use your primary device. Open the link on a separate, secondary device that does not have any sensitive information or contact details, and is used solely for viewing links. Carry out a factory reset on the device regularly (keeping in mind that this might not remove the spyware). Keep the secondary device turned off, with the battery removed, when not in use.
• Use a non-default browser for the phone. Pegasus is believed to target default browsers. The default browser for Android is Chrome and the default browser for iOS is Safari. Use an alternative browser such as Firefox Focus and open the link in that. However, there is no guarantee that Pegasus will not, or has not, already targeted other browsers.

Physical installation by an adversary

Pegasus can also be installed on your phone if an adversary gains physical access to the device. To reduce risk:

• Do not leave your device unattended and avoid handing over your phone to others.
• When crossing a border or checkpoint ensure that you can see your phone at all times Turn off the phone before arriving at the checkpoint, and have a complex passphrase consisting of both letters and numbers. Be aware that if your phone is taken then the device may be compromised.

For more information to protect yourself and your sources, consult CPJ’s Digital Safety Kit. Follow CPJ’s spyware coverage and advocacy to learn more about the impact on journalists in your area.

With thanks to Citizen Lab for valuable insight.